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Abstract: 
I expand Feldstein’s (1983) model by including flexible exchange rate and by introducing 
endogenous fiscal policy. Using this model, I demonstrate how a positive investment-
saving correlation can arise in a world with endogenous fiscal policy. I show that this 
correlation does not depend on capital mobility and therefore is compatible with any 
degree of capital mobility. This implies that the observed investment-saving comovement 
is not necessarily due to imperfect capital mobility. The model has a testable implication: 
it predicts a lack of Granger causality from private saving to private investment. 
Empirical examination of this prediction indicates that U.S. time series data is compatible 
with the hypothesis of endogenous fiscal policy during a flexible exchange rate period, 
but not during a fixed exchange rate period. 
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1In a closed economy, private investment can only be financed by domestic saving and
therefore investment and saving will be correlated.  However, in an open economy, at least part
of the investment can be financed by foreign saving.  Therefore, in an open economy, national
saving and investment may in principle diverge and move independently of each other.
However, the empirical findings by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein (1983) indicate
that investment and saving are highly correlated across countries.  They interpret these findings
as evidence of a lack of perfect capital mobility.1  This nterpretation of the investment-saving
comovement has been very controversial and a significant number of studies disagree with it
since it is in contrast with the general deregulation of capital markets and increased integration of
world financial markets that took place over the last 20–30 years.2
Several authors, like Tobin (1983), Westphal (1983), Roubini (1988), and Summers (1988),
have offered an alternative explanation for the investment-saving comovement.  If the government
is concerned about balancing a current account deficit, it can set the size of its spending (or its
budget deficit) endogenously by reacting to the gap between private saving and investment.  If the
government uses such an endogenous fiscal policy, then private investment and national saving
will also be correlated; i.e., this will be true regardless of the degree of capital mobility.
From a theoretical point of view, standard macroeconomic theory assigns the government
budget an exogenous policy role.  However, its discretionary use by governments for stabilization
purposes implies that policy makers actually react to events and situations occurring in the economy.
This makes fiscal policy endogenous.  In the new classical framework fiscal policy is treated in a
similar manner except that the emphasis is on unanticipated implementation of the policy.3 
Whether the government’s budget policy is exogenous or endogenous is important because
of its policy implications in the context of investment-saving correlation:  Feldstein and
Horioka’s finding that variations in saving are associated with variations in investment, implies
that under exogenous fiscal policy a reduction in the U.S. budget deficit will not improve
external balance, rather it will increase investments.  This conclusion, however, is not
necessarily correct if fiscal policy is endogenous in the sense described above.4
In this paper I present a variant of a standard neoclassical model modified for a large open
economy with flexible exchange rates.  Using the model, I analyze the implications of perfect
capital mobility and immobility for the investment-saving relationship and the crowding out
effects of expansionary fiscal policy on investment and trade balance.
The model presented here is an extension of the model discussed in Feldstein (1983).  The
present model expands beyond Feldstein’s model by explicitly introducing the market for foreign
2exchange as well as by addressing the role of fiscal policy in the context of investment-saving
comovement.  Unlike Feldstein (1983), who implicitly assumes that fiscal policy is exogenous, I
allow for the possibility of endogeneity in the conduct of fiscal policy.
The model demonstrates how a positive investment-saving correlation can arise in a world
with endogenous fiscal policy.  Since this correlation does not depend on capital mobility and is
therefore compatible with any degree of capital mobility, I conclude that tests of capital mobility
that are based on investment-saving correlation are not likely to be informative about the true
degree of capital mobility.
I also discuss testable implications of the model.  In particular, I show that an endogenous
fiscal policy hypothesis of the type considered in this paper predicts a lack of Granger causality
from private saving to private investment.  Empirical examination of this prediction indicates that
the U.S. time series data is compatible with the hypothesis of endogenous fiscal policy during a
flexible exchange rate period, but not during a fixed exchange rate period.  The implication is that
the observed investment-saving correlation in the U.S. time series may indeed be a result of an
endogenous fiscal policy.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the structure of the model.  In
Section 2 the implications of the model are analysed under the assumption of exogenous fiscal
policy.  In Section 3, the implications of the model are analysed under the assumption of
endogenous fiscal policy.  In Section 4, testable implications of the model are empirically
examined using the U.S. time series data.  The paper ends with conclusions.    
1. The Model  
Following Feldstein (1983), assume that the demand for gross domestic investment, I, is a
decreasing function of real interest rate, r:
   I =I(r) +x I    I¢<0 (1)
where x I is a zero mean random term with constant variance.  Supply of private saving, PS, s
an increasing function of the real interest rate:
   PS=S(r) +x s    S¢>0 (2)
where xs is a zero mean random term with constant variance.  I assume that the correlation
between x I and xs is zero.  I make this assumption in order to focus on the role of fiscal policy in
3generating investment-saving comovement.  Otherwise we need to address a possibility of a
“common cause” mechanism, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Exports, X, and imports, M depend on the real exchange rate, R, and are given by (3)
and (4):
   X =X(R) +x X    X¢ >0 (3)
   M =M(R) +x M    M¢ <0 (4)
where  x X, and  x M are random shocks with zero mean and constant variance.  From national
income accounting, net exports, NX, equal net capital outflow (net foreign investment), F,
which in turn is defined as capital outflow,  Fo, minus capital inflow, Fi, and is a decreasing
function of the real interest rate.  Thus,
   F =Fo– Fi =F(r) + x F    F ¢ £ 0 (5)
where  x F is a zero mean random term with constant variance.  In case of perfect capital mobility, 
   F ¢ =– ¥ , and if capital is completely immobile, then    F ¢ =0.
2. Exogenous Fiscal Policy
Now assume that the government’s receipts are fixed at  T0, and th t the expenditures, G,
are set exogenously.  The budget deficit is given by
   G – T =G0 +x G – T0 (6)
where  x G is a fiscal policy shock.  The model is closed by the national income identity
  PS– (G – T) – I =X – M (7)
which states that the excess of national saving over investment must match the trade balance.
Since F = X – M, (3), (4), and (5) imply that
   F (r) +x F =X(R) +x X – M(R) – x M (8)
which after total differentiation and rearrangement, yields
4   
dR=
F ¢ dr– dx X +dx M +dx F
X¢ – M¢
. (9)
Since    X¢ >0, and    M¢ <0, the denominator in (9) is always positive.  Therefore, equation (9)
implies that
   dR
dr
= F ¢
X¢ – M ¢
£ 0.  
That is, unless capital is completely immobile, an increase in interest rate (dr> 0) will lead to a 
lower exchange rate since the resulting capital inflow will cause an appreciation of the domestic
currency.  It also implies that a positive (negative) shock to imports (exports) devalues domestic
currency since it results in higher (lower) demand for (supply of) foreign currency.
Now substitute (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) into (7) to get
   S(r) +x s– G0 – x G +T0 – I(r) – x I=X(R) +x X– M(R) – x M. (10)
Taking the total differential of (10), and using (9) for dR, yields
   dr=
dx I+dx G – dx s+dx F
S¢ – I ¢ – F ¢
. (11)
Since    S¢ >0,    I ¢ <0, and    F ¢ £ 0, the denominator in (11) is always positive.  The equation states
that as long as capital is not perfectly mobile (i.e.,    F ¢ >– ¥ ), the interest rate rises when there is
a positive shock to either investment    (dx I >0), government expenditures    (dx G >0), or demand
for net foreign investment    (dx F >0).  However, if capital is perfectly mobile (i.e.,    F ¢ =– ¥ ),
then either shock will instantaneously result in capital inflow, completely satisfying the excess
demand for resources, and thus leaving the interest rate unchanged.
Substituting (11) into (9), gives dR in terms of all the possible shocks of the model:
   dR=F ¢
dx I+dx G – dx s+dx F
(X¢ – M¢ )(S¢ – I ¢ – F ¢ )
+
dx M – dx X +dx F
X ¢ – M¢
. (12)
Note that both denominators in equation (12) are positive.  Taking the total differential of (5) and
combining it with (11) yields
   dF =F ¢ dr+dx F =F ¢
dx I +dx G – dx s +dx F
S¢ – I ¢ – F ¢
+dx F (13)
5which shows the response of net capital outflow ( or net foreign investment), and thus of trade
balance, to various shocks.  Equations (12) and (13) can be used jointly for comparative statics
under alternative hypotheses about capital mobility.  For example, with perfect capital mobility
(i.e.,    F ¢ =– ¥ ), an increase in government spending    (dx G >0) causes a decrease in net foreign
investment (F) “one for one” and therefore results in capital inflow since
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dF
dx G
=–1.
Simultaneously,
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dR
dx G
=– 1
X¢ – M¢
<0,
which means that domestic currency appreciates reducing the external balance.  In other words,
an expansionary fiscal policy completely crowds out net exports, but has no effect on the interest
rate as
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dr
dx G
=0.
At the other extreme, if capital is completely immobile (   F ¢ =0), then the increased
government demand must be satisfied by domestic resources.  The first term on the right hand
side of (12) and (13) vanishes when    F ¢ =0.  Therefore, an expansionary fiscal policy leaves the
current account and the exchange rate unchanged and instead increases the interest rate since
   lim
F ¢ ® 0
dr
dx G
= 1
S¢ – I ¢
>0.
This leads to a crowding out of investment because
   
lim
F ¢ ® 0
dI
dx G
=
I¢
S¢ – I ¢
<0,
as can be seen from equation (14) below.  Using a similar argument, it follows that under partial
capital mobility, (i.e.,    0>F ¢ >– ¥ ), a higher budget deficit will crowd out both investment as
well as net export.
In order to see the relationship between investment and national saving, take the total
derivative of (1) and use (11) to get
6   dI=I ¢ dr+dx I =I ¢
dx I +dx G – dx s+dx F
S¢ – I ¢ – F ¢
+dx I (14)
which means that
   dI
dx s
=– I ¢
S¢ – I¢ – F ¢
. (15)
Under perfect capital mobility,
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dI
dx s
=0,
and so any change in domestic private saving (which changes national saving by an equal amount
since government saving is exogenous) is matched by a corresponding change in capital flow,
leaving investment unchanged.  Thus under perfect capital mobility, investment and national
saving will not be correlated.  If capital is immobile, however, i.e., if    F ¢ =0, th n
   lim
F ¢ ® 0
dI
dx s
=– I ¢
S¢ – I ¢
and therefore    0< dI
dx s
£ 1.  That is, higher national saving will lead to higher investment.  It is
this result that led Feldstein and Horioka (1980) to interpret the positive investment-saving
relationship they found as an indicator of a lack of perfect capital mobility.
3. Endogenous Fiscal Policy
Now consider a situation where the government has a reaction function through which it
responds to current account imbalances by adjusting its spending according to the gap between
private saving and investment.  In particular, suppose that fiscal policy reaction function is given
by
   G – T = a (PS– I) +x G – T0 (16)
where   0<a £ 1.  Substituting (1), (2), (3), (4), and (16) into (7), taking its total derivative, and
using (9) for dR yields
   dr=
(1– a )(dx s – dx I) – dx F – dx G
(1– a )(I ¢ – S¢ ) +F ¢
. (17)
7Here, if the government follows an endogenous fiscal policy of the type assumed in (16), then
investment and national saving will be correlated even if capital is perfectly mobile.  Therefore,
the observed positive correlation between investment and private saving is not necessarily an
indicator of a lack of perfect capital mobility.  To see this, suppose that there is a positive change
in private saving.  i.e.,    dx s >0.  Such a change will be followed by an adjustment of the
government’s budget deficit according to (16).  To get the exact expression, take the total
derivative of (16), replace dr by (17), and find   d(G – T).  This yields
  d(G – T) =    a (S¢ – I ¢ )dr+a dx s– a dx I +dx G
=    a (S¢ – I ¢ )
(1– a )(dx s – dx I) – dx F – dx G
(1– a )(I ¢ – S¢ ) +F ¢
+a dx s– a dx I+dx G. (18)
When capital is perfectly mobile, i.e.,    F ¢ =– ¥ , the first term on the right hand side of (18)
vanishes and
   d(G– T)
dx s
=a . 
The total differential of national saving is given by
   dNS= (1– a )S¢ +a I¢ dr+(1– a )dx s +a dx I – dx G, (19)
and since  dr=0 under perfect capital mobility, national saving will respond to the change in
private saving by    dNS
dx s
=(1– a ).  Note that in such an environment, private investment does not
respond to changes in private saving.  To see this, derive   dI
dx s
 by taking the total differential of
(1) and substituting (17) for dr: 
   dI
dx s
=
I ¢ (1– a)
(1– a )(I¢ – S¢ ) +F ¢
. (20)
Under perfect capital mobility we get
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dI
dx s
=0.
Thus, this model makes a testable prediction:  it predicts a lack of Granger causality from private
saving to investment.  However, national saving responds to changes in investment since
8   dNS
dx I
=a , which does not depend on  F ¢ .  Hence, in the case of endogenous fiscal policy,
investment and national saving will be correlated no matter what the degree of capital mobility is.
Note that the crowding out effect of fiscal policy here will be similar to the effect when
fiscal policy is exogenous.  To see this, substitute (17) into (9) to get
   dR=F ¢
(1– a )(dx s – dx I) – dx F – dx G
(X¢ – M¢ ) (1– a )(I ¢ – S¢ ) +F ¢
+
dx M – dx X +dx F
X¢ – M¢
(21)
which implies that under perfect capital mobility
   lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
dR
dx G
= lim
F ¢ ® – ¥
– F ¢
(X' – M')[(1– a)(I' – S') +F ']
<0  
by L’Hôspital’s rule.  Therefore, expansionary fiscal policy leads to an appreciation of domestic
currency and consequently causes a crowding out of net exports.  Since under perfect capital
mobility   dr=0 from (17),    dI
dx G
=0 and fiscal policy will have no effect on investment.
However, if capital is immobile, then    dR
dx G
=0, while
   dI
dx G
=– I ¢
(1– a )(I ¢ – S¢ )
<0,
so we get a crowding out of investment.
In summarize, the model presented here shows that a positive correlation between domestic
private investment and national saving is compatible with both, exogenous as well as
endogenous fiscal policy.  In case of exogenous fiscal policy, under perfect capital mobility,
domestic investment and national saving are not correlated, while under immobile capital they
tend to move together.  If fiscal policy is endogenous, then domestic investment and national
saving will be correlated even if capital is perfectly mobile.  In such case, an observed strong
correlation between national saving and domestic investment will not necessarily indicate a lack
of perfect capital mobility.  This hypothesis has a testable implication: it predicts a lack of
Granger causality from private saving to investment.
4. Granger Causality and Cointegration Test Results
As was shown in Section 4, the hypothesis of endogenous fiscal policy of the type
assumed in this paper predicts a lack of Granger causality from private saving to investment.  As
a test of this implication I run a bivariate Granger causality test between time series of gross
9private saving and gross private domestic investment using U.S. annual data covering the period
1929–89.  The data for the 1929–82 period is taken from the NIPA tables of the BEA.  For the
1983–89 period the data come from the Economic Report of the President (1990).  The series are
measured in 1982 dollars.  The plots of the time series of domestic investment and private saving
are shown on Figure 1.
The Granger causality test equation is given by 
   
It =a + b nIt –nSn =1
4
+ g nPSt – nSn=1
4
+ e t, (22)
where It denotes gross private domestic investment and  PSt denotes gross private saving.  The
null hypothesis is that private investment is not Granger-caused by private saving.  Technically,
this is tested by examining whether or not   g n =0 for each n simultaneously. 
The results are reported in Table 1.  I run the causality test for the entire sample period as
well as for two sub-periods, which correspond to periods of fixed and flexible exchange rate
regimes, respectively.  According to the results, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the
entire sample period.  The null hypothesis cannot be rejected also for the second subperiod, but it
is rejected at the 5% level of significance for the first subperiod.  This means that the data is
compatible with the hypothesis of endogenous fiscal policy during a flexible exchange rate period,
but not during a fixed exchange rate period.  Obviously, these findings do not prove that fiscal
policy was endogenous over 1973–89 period because a lack of Granger causality from private
saving to private investment could in principle be a consequence of other types of policies. For
comparison purposes it should be mentioned that Summers (1988) and Bayoumi (1990), using a
cross-section data of OECD and ten industrial countries, respectively, find that an endogenous
fiscal policy of the type modelled here might be playing an important role in generating the
positive investment-saving comevement obsereved in the data of open economies.
It is possible to verify these Granger causality test results by considering a cointegration
relationship between domestic investment and private saving.5  According to the Error-
Correction Representation Theorem proved by Engle and Granger (1987), the concepts of
cointegration and Granger causality are directly related.  Specifically, they show that if two series
are cointegrated, then there should be a Granger causality between these series at least in one
direction.  Thus, by examining the cointegration property of the investment-saving comovement,
we can check whether the Granger-causality test results are consistent with cointegration tests.
Several authors have examined the cointegration relationship between investment and
saving using the U.S. time series data.  See for example Miller (1988), Otto and Wirjanto
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(1989), Leachman (1991), Gulley (1992), and Levy (1994).  All these authors, however, focus
their attention on the relationship between the time series of national saving and domestic
investment.  Here I am interested in examining the relationship between private saving and
domestic investment.6
To test for cointegration, we first need to establish unit root properties of the time series of
private saving and domestic investment.   To determine whether private saving and domestic
investment series are stationary, we examine each series for a presence of unit roots using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the form
   
D xt =a 0 +a 1t +g xt– 1+ f i D xt – iSi =1
4
+ e t, (23)
where xt is the series we are examining and t is  linear time trend.  The null hypothesis is that
  g =0, which means that the series contains an unit root and is thus nonstationary, i.e.,   xt ~ I(1).
The alternative hypothesis is that the series are stationary, that is,   xt ~ I(0).
Initially, we test the hypothesis of an unit root in the series measured in levels.  The results
are reported in the first column of Table 2.  As the values of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-
statistics indicate, the hypothesis of nonstationarity cannot be rejected for domestic investment
(denoted I) and private saving (denoted PS).  Next, we test whether the first differences of the
series are nonstationary.  The figures presented in the last column of Table 2 indicate that the
hypothesis of an unit root in the differenced series can be rejected.7  The fore, we conclude that
private saving and domestic investment  series are   I(1), and thus can be represented as difference
stationary processes.  The results reported by Miller (1988), Otto and Wirjanto (1989),
Leachman (1991), Gulley (1992), and Levy (1994) on the unit root properties of domestic
investment in the U.S. are essentially identical to what I report here.
To test for cointegration between the time series of private saving and domestic investment,
I use Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood method which seems to have better statistical
properties than the more commonly used Engle-Granger (1987) two-step method.  Below I
define the test statistics used in this approach.  For a detailed description of Johansen’s maximum
likelihood method, see Johansen’s original article or Banerjee et al. (1993).
Johansen (1988) proposes two tests for estimating the number of cointegrating vectors.
The first, called maximal eigenvalue test, is given by the statistic
   l max=– nlog 1– l r (24)
11
where n is the number of observations, and l r is the r-th eigenvalue determined by solving the
determinantal equation associated with the residual product moment matrix constructed using the
residuals’ matrices.  The maximal eigenvalue test is designed to test   H(r – 1) against  H(r).  That
is, the null hypothesis is that there are   (r –1) cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r.
The second test, called trace test, is designed for testing   H(r) against  H(m), where   r<m.
The trace statistic is given by
   J T =–n log 1– l iSi =r +1
m
. (25)
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 3.  The critical values I use are taken
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).8  In estimating the cointegration vectors I use VAR(4).
In Johansen’s framework the number of cointegrating vectors is determined sequentially.
We start with the hypothesis that there are no cointegrating relations, that is,   =0.  We continue
only if this hypothesis is rejected.  In that case we test the hypothesis that there is at most one
cointegrating vector (   r £ 1), and so on.  The test results can be interpreted in favor of cointegration
only if   0<r <m.  Full rank, that is   r=m, only indicates that the process is stationary. 
Following this sequential procedure, we find that the time series of domestic investment
and private saving are cointegrated only during the 1929–72 period (with one cointegrating
vector, i.e.,  r=1).  To see this, look at the middle part in Table 3: the values of both test
statistics,  l max=12.79 and   J T =13.40, are slightly bigger than the corresponding 10% critical
values.  Therefore, the null of no cointegrating vectors ( r=0) is rejected in favour of the
alternative with 10% significance.  Now we proceed to the next hypothesis,   r £ 1.  Here we see
that both test statistics (0.31 and 0.31) are below the corresponding critical values.9  Therefore
the null of one or less cointegrating vectors, (   r £ 1), cannot be rejected.  Since the hypothesis of
zero cointegrating vector was rejected in the preceding stage, we conclude that   r=1.  That is,
domestic investment and private saving are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector.
During the sample periods 1929–89 and 1973–89, the test statistics are not statistically
significant in the first stage of the testing.  Therefore the null of zero cointegrating vectors (  r=0)
cannot be rejected for these periods.  That is, domestic investment and private saving are not
cointegrated for these sample periods.  Thus, we find that the series are cointegrated during fixed
exchange rate period, but not during flexible exchange rate period.  Miller (1988) reports similar
findings for the time series of nati nal saving and domestic investment.
These findings are consistent with Granger causality test results reported above.  This is
12
because a cointegration relationship between the two series implies Granger causality at least in
one direction.  Indeed, for the 1929-72 period where we find an evidence of cointegration, we
rejected the null of no Granger causality from private saving to domestic investment.  For the
other two sample periods, 1929–89 and 1973–89, we find that the two series are not
cointegrated.  And the finding that there is no Granger causality during these sample periods is
clearly consistent with the cointegration test results.10
An additional implication of the observed cointegration of domestic investment and private
saving during the fixed exchange rate period can be derived by looking at the national income
accounting identity given in equation (7), which can be rewritten as
  PS– I = X – M + G– T . (26)
If PS and I are cointegrated, then their linear combination given on the left hand side of
equation (26) should be stationary.11  Consequently, the right hand side of (26), which is a sum
of budget deficit and current account balance, should also be stationary during the fixed exchange
rate period.  On the other hand, during the periods of no cointegration, 1929–89 and 1973–89,
we expect this sum to be nonstationary.
To examine the empirical validity of this prediction, I have applied Augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit root test to the   X – M + G – T  series.  The results reported in Table 2 indicate that
the unit root tests are not fully consistent with the cointegration test results.  During the 1929-89
and 1973-89 periods the   X – M + G – T  series are nonstationary (the null of unit root cannot
be rejected) as predicted by cointegration test results.  However, it is nonstationary also during
the 1929–72 period which is inconsistent with the finding that domestic investment and private
saving are cointegrated during that period.
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I expand the standard neoclassical open economy model by introducing
endogenous fiscal policy.  Using the model, I demonstrate analytically how a positive
investment-saving correlation can arise in a world with endogenous fiscal policy.  I also show
that this correlation does not depend on capital mobility and therefore is compatible with any
degree of capital mobility.  This means that the observed investment-saving comovement in the
U.S. time series data does not necessarily imply imperfect capital mobility.  The hypothesis of
endogenous fiscal policy predicts a lack of Granger causality from private saving to investment.
Empirical examination of this prediction indicates that the U.S. time series data of private saving
13
and investment is compatible with the hypothesis of endogenous fiscal policy during a flexible
exchange rate period, but not during a fixed exchange rate period.  
The implication is that the investment-saving comovement observed in the U.S. time series
data may indeed be due to an endogenous fiscal policy, where the government is trying to
balance the current account by setting its budget plans according to the gap between private
saving and investment.
How can we explain the differences in results between the fixed and flexible exchange rate
periods?  One possibility is that during fixed exchange rate period investment and saving were
cointegrated simply because capital was not very mobile.  The abandonment of the Breton Wood
system and the elimination of capital controls in the early 1970s along with the increased
integration of worlds financial markets during the last 20 years may have led to an increased
international capital mobility which eliminated the long-run (i.e., cointegration) relationship
between investment and saving.
An alternative explanation may be given along the lines suggested in this paper.  That is, it
is possible that the government’s fiscal policy was indeed endogenous during the flexible
exchange rate period, but not during fixed exchange rate period.  Note that in the context of the
model presented in the paper, what I have in mind is a very specific form of endogeneity: the
government reacts to current account imbalances by adjusting its budget balance according to the
gap between private saving and investment.
In general it may be argued that this kind of policy is more plausible during fixed, rather
than flexible exchange rate periods as Miller (1988) suggests.  An examination of the U.S. trade
deficit development over the last 10–15 years, however, suggests the opposite.  The continuous
appreciation of the dollar during the 1980s has led to a large trade and current account deficits
which was viewed by many observers and administration officials as a cause for great concern.
The increase in trade deficit led to a loss of exports and substitution of imports for domestic
production.  Consequently, there was a significant pressure on policy makers from the affected
industries to reduce the trade deficit.  Therefore, an endogenous fiscal policy was a rather likely
scenario for the U.S. during the flexible exchange rate period.12  Summers (1988) and Bayoumi
(1990) reach a similar conclusion using cross-country data, which includes the U.S.
An extension of this study tries to evaluate the empirical validity of the endogenous fiscal
policy hypothesis by directly estimating a fiscal policy reaction function of the type considered in
this paper using U.S. time series data.  Although preliminary results suggest that the hypothesis
of endogenous fiscal policy cannot be rejected, this question is still under investigation.
Notes
1. Studies that expand Feldstein and Horioka’s analysis to different time periods and samples, include 
Caprio and Howard (1984), Murphy (1984), Obstfeld (1986a, 1986b), and Wong (1988).
2. See, e.g., Tobin (1983), Westphal (1983), Obstfeld (1986a, 1986b), Frankel and MacArthur (1988), 
Ghosh (1990), Tesar (1991), and Baxter and Crucini (1993).
3. These studies often assume fiscal dominance, which means that fiscal authorities set their budget policy
exogenously, and monetary authorities then have no choice but accommodate it.  See, e.g., Sargent and
Wallace (1981).  From the empirical point of view, classification of government budget policy as 
exogenous or endogenous seems largely to depend on the hypothesis been tested.  For example, Evans 
(1987), Ghosh (1990), and Moreno (1988) model government budget deficit as exogenous while 
Dooley et al. (1987), Fieleke (1982), and Pigott (1989) treat the budget policy as endogenous.
4. The “rule of thumb” published by Congressional Budget Office (1985, p. 75) suggests that 
government budget policy is endogenous in CBO’s view.
5. I thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this idea.
6. Although Bayoumi (1990) examines the relationship between private saving and domestic investment, 
he does not use the cointegration methodology since he estimates cross- ection r gressions using data 
from ten industrial countries.  Argimón and Roldán (1994) do examine the cointegration relationship 
between private saving and domestic investment but their data set does not include the U.S.
7. The unit root test results for the   X– M + G– T  series are discussed below.
8. I choose not to use more commonly used critical values tabulated by Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
since Podivinsky (1990) shows that those critical values may be invalid for sample sizes of 100 or less.
9. The equality of these statistics is not a coincidence.  In the final stage of sequential testing, their 
values always equal by construction of these tests. 
10.However, it should be noted that an opposite result on Granger causality during these sample 
periods would not contradict cointegration test results either.  This is because if there is no 
cointegration, then either one, Granger causality and Granger noncausality, are possible.
11.Actually, this analysis is based on the finding (not reported in Table 3) that the cointegrating vector 
is  [1,–1].  Leachman (1991) reports a similar finding.
12.It should be mentioned, however, that setting the budget deficit according to the gap between 
private saving and investment is not the only way for reducing current account deficit.  A reduction 
in a current account deficit can be accomplished also by means of monetary policy by affecting the 
exchange rate and thus the level of economic activity.  Other possibilities include the use of investment 
tax credit, the adjustment of depreciation allowance schemes, etc.  See Feldstein and Bacchetta (1989).
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Figure 1.Private Saving and Domestic Investment, U.S., 1929–89, Billions of 1982 Dollars.
(Source: National Income and Product Accounts of the U. S., Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce, 1992.)
Table 1. Granger Causality Test Results
Sample Period F-Statistic p-value Is the  H0 rejected?
1929–89 1.93 0.12 No
1929–72 2.95b 0.03 Yes
1973–89 0.47 0.75 No
Note:The  H0 hypothesis is that private investment is not Granger caused by private saving.
Superscript b indicates a 5% significance.
Table 2. Unit Root Test Results
Period Series Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
__________________________________
Levels First differences
1929–89 I –2.46 –4.25a
PS –2.23 –4.56a
  X – M + G – T –3.15 –4.29a
1929–72 I –2.83 –3.73b
PS –2.12 –3.40c
  X – M + G – T –2.69 –3.42c
1973–89 I –1.51 –3.58c
PS –0.91 –4.70a
  X – M + G – T –2.04 –3.62c
Note:I used Box-Pierce, Ljung-Box, and Lagrange Multiplier tests to verify that the error terms in all the 
regressions reported in this paper are not serially correlated.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance critical values for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics ar  as 
follows: –4.12, –3.49, and –3.17 for the period 1929–89; –4.20, –3.52, and –3.19 for the period 
1929–72;  and –4.61, –3.71, and –3.29 for the period 1973–89, respectively.  These critical values are 
tabulated in MacKinnon (1991).
Notation: I = Domestic Investment, PS = Private Saving, X = Exports, M = Imports, G = Government
Expenditure, and T = Government Revenue.
Table 3. Cointegration Test Results
Sample Variables Test   H0   H1 Test Critical Values
Period Included Statistic 95% 90%
1929–89 I, PS   l max   r=0   r=1 10.64 14.06 12.07
   r£ 1   r=2 0.24 3.76 2.68
J T   r=0    r‡ 1 10.88 15.41 13.32
   r£ 1   r=2 0.24 3.76 2.68
1929–72 I, PS   l max   r=0   r=1 12.79c 14.06 12.07
   r£ 1   r=2 0.31 3.76 2.68
J T   r=0    r‡ 1 13.40c 15.41 13.32
   r£ 1   r=2 0.31 3.76 2.68
1973–89 I, PS   l max   r=0   r=1 8.98 14.06 12.07
   r£ 1   r=2 4.42 3.76 2.68
J T   r=0    r‡ 1 13.21 15.41 13.32
   r£ 1   r=2 4.42 3.76 2.68
Note:Superscript c indicates a 10% statistical significance.
The critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
  l max is the maximal eigenvalue test statistic defined in (24).
J T is the trace test statistic defined in (25).
r is the number of cointegrating vectors.
